Dear Global Impact Readers,

How many of you were glued to the progress of flight SPAR19 as it departed Malaysia, crossed Indonesia, and after skirting the Philippines, landed in Taiwan?

We all knew where it was going and who was on board. We all knew that the third person in line to the US presidency visiting the self-ruled island would anger Beijing, as it had repeatedly warned against it. And that’s exactly what happened.

In this issue, the SCMP’s US bureau chief, Robert Delaney, looks back at the most high-profile visit by a US official to Taiwan in 25 years, unpacks the events that followed, and examines the fallout of what could be a major milestone in US-China relations.

Andrew Mullen
Deputy Editor, Political Economy

Pelosi ‘proud of trip to Taiwan’, Beijing promises a new ‘normal’

For folks not inclined to track the regular drip of US-China diplomatic animosity, US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan last week probably grabbed their attention in a way that events defining the bilateral relationship had not done in years.

Not since Houston Rockets general manager Daryl Morey tweeted his support for Hong Kong’s anti-government protesters in 2019 – nearly bringing the National Basketball League’s business in China to a halt – have so many non-policy wonks tuned into a US-China spat.

This should be no surprise since the potential consequences of tensions in the Taiwan Strait have risen sharply in recent years, making a brouhaha over professional sports seem as silly as schoolyard taunts.

Reports about how supply chains for the semiconductor chips that run everything from iPhones to cars to medical devices could be severed have brought to the forefront how devastating a military conflict between the rapidly modernising People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and US military forces in the western Pacific would be.

Pelosi’s visit seemed to many the epitome of audacity. Even US President Joe Biden indicated initially that he wasn’t for the plan when he said, amid reports that it was in the works, that the US military didn’t think such a trip was a good idea.

Apparently resigned to Pelosi’s resolve, the Biden administration’s tone became supportive shortly before she departed, and it continued to insist afterwards – as the PLA surrounded Taiwan – that the House speaker wasn’t engaging in anything that violated the US government’s oft-repeated commitment to a one-China policy.

That has allowed Beijing to portray Biden as the prime culprit in trying to alter the status quo, but a closer look at policies of predecessor Donald Trump shows how the groundwork was laid for Pelosi’s arrival well before he took office.

Growing support for Taiwan in Washington has mirrored the strength of anti-Beijing sentiment among both political parties in America. Some call it an attempt to contain Beijing’s geopolitical legitimacy and kneecap Chinese companies taking market share from US multinationals. Others see America’s harder line against China as a rational response to economic policies that have disadvantaged foreign companies in the country.

Regardless of the viewpoint, closer engagement between US and Taiwanese officials since Trump signed the Taiwan Travel Act into law in 2018 – and began sending high-level officials from the departments of state and commerce to Taipei – is undeniable.

That law is only the second piece of legislation to be passed on the subject of US-Taiwan relations since Washington severed diplomatic ties with Taipei in 1972. The first was the Taiwan Relations Act. Passed in 1979, the relations act is now often invoked by US officials before the three joint communiques between Beijing and the US government that re-established formal diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Biden wasted no time in showing support for Taiwan. He dispatched Chris Dodd, a former US senator and long-time friend of the president, to the island, along with former US deputy secretaries of state Richard Armitage and James Steinberg, just weeks into his presidency.

Dodd et al were not sitting officials, but Biden’s next move should have dismissed any notions that he was backing away from bipartisan appeals in the US to stick with precedents started under Trump.

Weeks later, the State Department issued new guidelines meant to “encourage US government engagement with Taiwan that reflects our deepening unofficial relationship”.

Just a few weeks before Pelosi’s visit, US and Taiwanese officials held a first round of talks on an initiative aimed at boosting trade ties “based on shared values” – formally opening another front on which Biden is trying to counter Beijing’s economic influence.

Having watched all of the above, and with the media buzzing with reports of Pelosi’s intention to visit Taiwan, US engagement with the island was top of mind when Biden conducted his fifth call with President Xi Jinping since he moved into the White House.

So, when Pelosi landed in Taipei just days after Xi’s warning that China remained staunchly committed to resisting “interference by external forces” in Taiwan, no one was surprised that the PLA launched a round of live-fire military exercises.

However, some were taken aback by the extent of the drills, with the G7 issuing a statement that, for the first time, specifically called out China for its policies. In response, Beijing cancelled a meeting between Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his Japanese counterpart, Yoshimasa Hayashi, on the sidelines of events hosted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean). Wang also reportedly staged two walkouts at the meetings.

Halfway through the PLA’s drills, the contrast between how Beijing and Washington portrayed the regional reaction was clear in each side’s take on Asean’s reaction. Jing Quan, a minister at China’s Washington embassy, and White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby – speaking in separate and nearly simultaneous briefings – both claimed to have broad international support behind them, with each asserting that they had the backing of the Asean bloc.

Looking forward, we can expect more aggressive posturing from both sides.

In Washington, proposed legislation called the Taiwan Policy Act threatens to upend Washington’s decades-old policy as it would designate Taiwan as a “major non-Nato ally”, meaning it would be viewed as one of Washington’s closest global partners.

With such a bill progressing through a US Congress that has made closer engagement with Taiwan one among very few bipartisan causes, we should not discount expectations that massive PLA drills around the island may be the new normal.